Needlenose

The Washington Post reports today:

The Iraqi government announced Monday that it intends to let voters decide in January whether the departure of U.S. troops should be accelerated.

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s cabinet is submitting a draft law to parliament asking it to authorize and fund a referendum on the bilateral agreement that regulates the presence of U.S. troops, the government announced.

The referendum would be held during January’s national election.

U.S. officials have quietly lobbied the Iraqi government to suspend plans to hold the referendum, because they’re all but certain voters would annul the agreement.

If that were to happen, U.S. troops would have one year to depart, moving up their targeted December 2011 withdrawal date by almost a year.

. . . When the security agreement was negotiated last year, some lawmakers demanded that its implementation on Jan. 1 be followed by a referendum. The referendum was supposed to happen in July, but the government took no action, leading American officials to believe it would never happen.

Note that if the Iraqi government really wanted a referendum and a faster U.S. withdrawal, they could have held the vote last month as promised.

Postponing it until January (or whenever the national elections are eventually held) suggests that the main concern is keeping the American occupation alive as a political issue — and thereby distracting attention from the Iraqi government’s ongoing inability to deliver basic services like electricity.  It seems Maliki & Co. don’t want to go into that election with their own performance as the primary issue.

What’s important about the memo, revealed yesterday, from an army colonel advising American forces in Iraq that recommends an accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops from that country?

It wasn’t an expression of official policy, just one colonel’s advice — and we quickly learned the author, Col. Timothy Reese, was something of a loose cannon in terms of his opinions.

Even so, after years of neocon hype of inevitable “victory,” and as recently as three months ago (even after announcing a withdrawal timeline), President Obama still pretending that there was a mission to be accomplished, Col. Reese has formally placed on the table for discussion within the Pentagon an obvious truth regarding the U.S. in Iraq: “The use of the military instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected.“

It’s about time that top U.S. military officials started facing that fact. For five years now, I’ve been writing about the ability of Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and the Shiite-dominated government he shepherded into power to resist American pressure — and been right nearly every time I bet on that ability to prevail.

A year ago, when the conventional wisdom was that Iraqi prime minister Maliki’s demands for a withdrawal timeline (during negotiations for a Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA) were just to placate Iraqi public opinion while coming up with a way for the U.S. to stay, I wrote that Sistani’s plan since 2004 was “to use the American military as a contractor of sorts to help cement a Shiite-led government’s power, then nudge us aside when the task was more or less complete.”

Maliki’s successful insistence on a timeline, and the unexpected restrictions that Col. Reese’s memo says are now being placed on U.S. troops in the wake of the SOFA being implemented, represent that plan in action. And contrary to what many progressives would rightly hope, it’s not an expression of sovereignty on behalf of the Iraqi people. It’s Robert Shaw being hustled out of the building at the end of “The Sting.”

Sure, prime minister Maliki may make noise about extending the U.S. presence — but make no mistake, any new agreement will be on the Iraqi government’s terms, which will have far less to do with building a functional, thriving democracy than with continuing to use American military might to crush Maliki’s political enemies.

The Iraq war was a “victory” not for the United States, nor for the Iraqi people, but rather for a corrupt and authoritarian-leaning regime whose most redeeming characteristic is that it isn’t quite as brutal and dictatorial (yet, anyway) as Saddam Hussein’s — which, sadly, was the obviously probable end result all along.

(Cross-posted at Firedoglake.)

Six years ago today, on May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush stood on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln in an elaborately executed photo-op and proclaimed, “Major combat operations in Iraq have ended.”

At that time, 140 U.S. soldiers had died in Iraq; six years later, the number of 4,281 (with three more deaths reported today), and the toll of Iraqi fatalities is perhaps a hundred times higher or more.

Today’s anniversary is all the more troubling since President Obama, who came into office firmly promising to end the U.S. occupation, seems to still buy into the idea that there is an American “mission” to be accomplished. In his press conference Wednesday night, he said:

Part of the reason why I called for a gradual withdrawal as opposed to a precipitous one was precisely because more work needs to be done on the political side to further isolate whatever remnants of Al Qaida in Iraq still exists.

And I’m very confident that, with our commander on the ground, General Odierno, with Chris Hill, our new ambassador, having been approved and already getting his team in place, that they are going to be able to work effectively with the Maliki government to create the conditions for an ultimate transfer after the national elections.

But there’s some serious work to do on making sure that how they divvy up oil revenues is ultimately settled, what the provincial powers are and boundaries, the relationship between the Kurds and the central government, the relationship between the Shia and the Kurds. Are they incorporating effectively Sunnis, Sons of Iraq, into the structure of the armed forces in a way that’s equitable and just?

Those are all issues that have not been settled the way they need to be settled.

I have bad news for you, Mr. President: those issues are not going to be settled, because the Maliki government has no interest in settling them to the other factions’ liking. I’ve watched since 2005 as the Bush/Cheneyites — with more leverage over the fledgling Iraqi government, and fewer scruples — tried to browbeat the Jaafari regime, and then Maliki, into adopting the kind of reconciliation measures just described.

I predicted then that U.S. pressure would fail, and there’s even less chance of it succeeding now. For better or worse, Iraq’s Shiite leaders view power as a winner-take-all game, and they’re not going to take any chances by sharing. Which is why, by talking up “work to do” and “conditions for an ultimate transfer,” Obama is painting himself into a dangerous corner.

As Spencer Ackerman wrote yesterday, “What was true for Bush is true for Obama: devising responsible approaches to Iraq require a firm handling of the facts involved, not wishful thinking.” For all the talk of conditional engagement, the only way Obama’s policy in Iraq will differ from the previous administration will be if he says flatly that reconciliation or no reconciliation, the U.S. is leaving. Six years after the disastrous “Mission Accomplished” stunt, it’s time for Obama to make that clear.

(Cross-posted at Firedoglake.)

A month ago in this space, I expressed skepticism about President Obama’s announced plan for withdrawing from Iraq — not so much because he was backing down from the timeline he campaigned on, but rather because the generals assigned to implement the plan might think he was.

This report today from Jane Arraf of the Christian Science Monitor doesn’t make me feel any better:

In an exclusive interview, the top US ground commander in Iraq says that while Iraqi forces have made huge strides, Iraqi officials are likely to ask for US help in the key cities of Baquba and Mosul, meaning that American troops may stay there after the deadline for redeployment to major bases. Senior military commanders say US troops will also likely stay on in the southern city of Basra.

“In Mosul and Diyala [Province], as we do a combined or joint assessment of the situation on the ground, I have every expectation that both sides will say we need to stay with this a little bit longer until this improves,” says Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, echoing sentiments of Iraqi officials concerned about ongoing fighting in those areas. . . .

“I think the Iraqis know that there are some things that have to occur before we leave,” he says. “They know that there are some capabilities that they have to develop. I think they’ll be up to task when we do leave by 2011.“

Despite the wrangling it took for the Iraqi government to impose a withdrawal deadline on the Bush misadministration, I’m not surprised that they might turn around and ask for extensions. I kept trying to tell people during last year’s negotiations that Prime Minister Maliki’s goal wasn’t necessarily to force the Americans out, but rather to ensure that if they stayed, it would be on the Iraqi government’s terms.

By that, I mean that instead of supporting a (mythical) nascent democracy as it gains momentum, U.S. troops would more likely be subcontractors used by a partisan/sectarian regime to suppress its opponents. As the Maliki government reneges on promises of political reconciliation, that fate becomes more likely. By the time it become obvious to everyone, though, the Obama administration may feel too inextricably bound to its commitments to abandon our supposed Iraqi allies.

Oh, well. At least we’re not getting ourselves mired in deeper in Afghanistan at the same… ooooops!

(Cross-posted at Firedoglake.)

Spencer Ackerman, among others, has posted the details on President Obama’s announcement today of his planned timeline for withdrawing troops from Iraq.

This morning’s New York Times, though, had an ominous background description of the plan, attributed to “administration officials”:

The plan would maintain relatively high troop levels through Iraq’s parliamentary elections, to be held in December, before beginning in earnest to meet the August 2010 target for removing combat forces, the officials said.

. . . The withdrawal would start slowly, with 2 of the 14 American combat brigades now in Iraq pulling out before the December elections, officials said. After the transition to a new government, the withdrawal would accelerate early next year.

“The commanders are concerned about maximizing their numbers on the ground for as long as possible, at least until we get to the other side of the elections,” another senior official said.

Marc Lynch (neé Abu Aardvark) explains the problem with this plan:

Iraq’s Parliamentary elections have not yet been scheduled and don’t even have an electoral law, and according to a number of senior Iraqi politicians probably will not be held until March 2010 (not December 2009). That would then give the U.S. about five months to withdraw the bulk of the dozen combat brigades which would reportedly remain. And then, keep in mind that U.S. officials generally agree (correctly) that the most dangerous period of elections is actually in their aftermath, when disgruntled losers might turn to violence or other destabilizing measures. So the following month will likely not seem a good time either. So that would leave four months to move, what — 9 brigades? Did someone say precipitous? Good luck with that.

I’ve never been too worked up over debates about the size of a “residual force” after the U.S. withdraws the bulk of its troops from Iraq — in my view, that’s the last 25-30% of a process that will take on a logic of its own once it has begun. The important thing has been to begin the process.

For that exact reason, I’m worried now. As Lynch notes, this slow-starting withdrawal plan originated among folks (in the military and elsewhere) who were perfectly comfortable with not withdrawing from Iraq at all.

President Obama may think that he’s worked a compromise that has gotten those skeptics/opponents to buy into accepting a withdrawal. But when I see that John McCain is “cautiously optimistic” about Obama’s plan, I fear that they think they’ve lured him into a trap. Which means that someone is in for an unpleasant surprise.

(Cross-posted at Firedoglake.)