Needlenose

What’s important about the memo, revealed yesterday, from an army colonel advising American forces in Iraq that recommends an accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops from that country?

It wasn’t an expression of official policy, just one colonel’s advice — and we quickly learned the author, Col. Timothy Reese, was something of a loose cannon in terms of his opinions.

Even so, after years of neocon hype of inevitable “victory,” and as recently as three months ago (even after announcing a withdrawal timeline), President Obama still pretending that there was a mission to be accomplished, Col. Reese has formally placed on the table for discussion within the Pentagon an obvious truth regarding the U.S. in Iraq: “The use of the military instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected.“

It’s about time that top U.S. military officials started facing that fact. For five years now, I’ve been writing about the ability of Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and the Shiite-dominated government he shepherded into power to resist American pressure — and been right nearly every time I bet on that ability to prevail.

A year ago, when the conventional wisdom was that Iraqi prime minister Maliki’s demands for a withdrawal timeline (during negotiations for a Status of Forces Agreement, or SOFA) were just to placate Iraqi public opinion while coming up with a way for the U.S. to stay, I wrote that Sistani’s plan since 2004 was “to use the American military as a contractor of sorts to help cement a Shiite-led government’s power, then nudge us aside when the task was more or less complete.”

Maliki’s successful insistence on a timeline, and the unexpected restrictions that Col. Reese’s memo says are now being placed on U.S. troops in the wake of the SOFA being implemented, represent that plan in action. And contrary to what many progressives would rightly hope, it’s not an expression of sovereignty on behalf of the Iraqi people. It’s Robert Shaw being hustled out of the building at the end of “The Sting.”

Sure, prime minister Maliki may make noise about extending the U.S. presence — but make no mistake, any new agreement will be on the Iraqi government’s terms, which will have far less to do with building a functional, thriving democracy than with continuing to use American military might to crush Maliki’s political enemies.

The Iraq war was a “victory” not for the United States, nor for the Iraqi people, but rather for a corrupt and authoritarian-leaning regime whose most redeeming characteristic is that it isn’t quite as brutal and dictatorial (yet, anyway) as Saddam Hussein’s — which, sadly, was the obviously probable end result all along.

(Cross-posted at Firedoglake.)

Six years ago today, on May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush stood on the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln in an elaborately executed photo-op and proclaimed, “Major combat operations in Iraq have ended.”

At that time, 140 U.S. soldiers had died in Iraq; six years later, the number of 4,281 (with three more deaths reported today), and the toll of Iraqi fatalities is perhaps a hundred times higher or more.

Today’s anniversary is all the more troubling since President Obama, who came into office firmly promising to end the U.S. occupation, seems to still buy into the idea that there is an American “mission” to be accomplished. In his press conference Wednesday night, he said:

Part of the reason why I called for a gradual withdrawal as opposed to a precipitous one was precisely because more work needs to be done on the political side to further isolate whatever remnants of Al Qaida in Iraq still exists.

And I’m very confident that, with our commander on the ground, General Odierno, with Chris Hill, our new ambassador, having been approved and already getting his team in place, that they are going to be able to work effectively with the Maliki government to create the conditions for an ultimate transfer after the national elections.

But there’s some serious work to do on making sure that how they divvy up oil revenues is ultimately settled, what the provincial powers are and boundaries, the relationship between the Kurds and the central government, the relationship between the Shia and the Kurds. Are they incorporating effectively Sunnis, Sons of Iraq, into the structure of the armed forces in a way that’s equitable and just?

Those are all issues that have not been settled the way they need to be settled.

I have bad news for you, Mr. President: those issues are not going to be settled, because the Maliki government has no interest in settling them to the other factions’ liking. I’ve watched since 2005 as the Bush/Cheneyites — with more leverage over the fledgling Iraqi government, and fewer scruples — tried to browbeat the Jaafari regime, and then Maliki, into adopting the kind of reconciliation measures just described.

I predicted then that U.S. pressure would fail, and there’s even less chance of it succeeding now. For better or worse, Iraq’s Shiite leaders view power as a winner-take-all game, and they’re not going to take any chances by sharing. Which is why, by talking up “work to do” and “conditions for an ultimate transfer,” Obama is painting himself into a dangerous corner.

As Spencer Ackerman wrote yesterday, “What was true for Bush is true for Obama: devising responsible approaches to Iraq require a firm handling of the facts involved, not wishful thinking.” For all the talk of conditional engagement, the only way Obama’s policy in Iraq will differ from the previous administration will be if he says flatly that reconciliation or no reconciliation, the U.S. is leaving. Six years after the disastrous “Mission Accomplished” stunt, it’s time for Obama to make that clear.

(Cross-posted at Firedoglake.)

A month ago in this space, I expressed skepticism about President Obama’s announced plan for withdrawing from Iraq — not so much because he was backing down from the timeline he campaigned on, but rather because the generals assigned to implement the plan might think he was.

This report today from Jane Arraf of the Christian Science Monitor doesn’t make me feel any better:

In an exclusive interview, the top US ground commander in Iraq says that while Iraqi forces have made huge strides, Iraqi officials are likely to ask for US help in the key cities of Baquba and Mosul, meaning that American troops may stay there after the deadline for redeployment to major bases. Senior military commanders say US troops will also likely stay on in the southern city of Basra.

“In Mosul and Diyala [Province], as we do a combined or joint assessment of the situation on the ground, I have every expectation that both sides will say we need to stay with this a little bit longer until this improves,” says Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin, echoing sentiments of Iraqi officials concerned about ongoing fighting in those areas. . . .

“I think the Iraqis know that there are some things that have to occur before we leave,” he says. “They know that there are some capabilities that they have to develop. I think they’ll be up to task when we do leave by 2011.“

Despite the wrangling it took for the Iraqi government to impose a withdrawal deadline on the Bush misadministration, I’m not surprised that they might turn around and ask for extensions. I kept trying to tell people during last year’s negotiations that Prime Minister Maliki’s goal wasn’t necessarily to force the Americans out, but rather to ensure that if they stayed, it would be on the Iraqi government’s terms.

By that, I mean that instead of supporting a (mythical) nascent democracy as it gains momentum, U.S. troops would more likely be subcontractors used by a partisan/sectarian regime to suppress its opponents. As the Maliki government reneges on promises of political reconciliation, that fate becomes more likely. By the time it become obvious to everyone, though, the Obama administration may feel too inextricably bound to its commitments to abandon our supposed Iraqi allies.

Oh, well. At least we’re not getting ourselves mired in deeper in Afghanistan at the same… ooooops!

(Cross-posted at Firedoglake.)

President Barack Obama, February 27, 2009: “To the Iraqi people, let me be clear about America’s intentions — the United States pursues no claim on your territory or your resources.”

After, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, having exhausted all alternatives.

The Associated Press reports today from Iraq:

Iraqi officials acknowledged Sunday that there was some fraud in last month’s provincial elections but not enough to force a new vote in any province.

Faraj al-Haidari, chairman of the election commission, said final results of the Jan. 31 voting would be certified and announced this week. Voters chose members of ruling provincial councils in an election seen as a dress rehearsal for parliamentary balloting by the end of the year.

. . . Al-Haidari told The Associated Press that ballots in more than 30 polling stations nationwide were nullified because of fraud but that was not enough to declare the election a failure.

He gave no further details. But one official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not supposed to talk about the vote to media, said the most widespread fraud appeared to have occurred in Diyala province, which has large Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish communities and an ongoing insurgency.

A coalition including the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni political group, led in Diyala with 21.1 percent of the vote followed by a Kurdish alliance with 17.2 percent, according to preliminary results.

Al-Maliki’s coalition finished fourth in Diyala with 9.5 percent.

I have to admit, I’m impressed with the fragmented voting results, which really do suggest a lack of voting fraud (especially contrasted with the frequent 90%-plus provincial majorities common in the national parliamentary elections).  If the worst fraud led to a 21%-to-17% victory, that’s progress.

At the same time, things could easily revert to form in the next national elections, which are scheduled to come at the end of this year (but could be postponed, as the provincial voting was).  This round of voting featured Shiite parties competing against one another in Shiite-dominated provinces, and the same in predominantly Sunni provinces.

When the ability to form a national government is on the line again, the incentives to build sectarian coalitions — and manipulate the vote for maximum “support” — will be back.

From Reuters a couple of days ago (via Salam Pax):

Before leaving Washington last week to deliver a major foreign policy speech in Germany, [Vice President Joseph] Biden chided Baghdad for failing to settle disputes over the city of Kirkuk and to enact a law dividing oil revenue, among other issues.

“I think our administration is going to have to be very deeply involved. We are going to have to get in there and be much more aggressive in forcing them to deal with these issues,” Biden said.

Asked about Biden’s remarks on Tuesday, [Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-]Maliki, an increasingly assertive leader whose followers won surprise victories in provincial elections last month, fired back.

“I believe talk about applying pressure on the Iraqi government or taking hard measures against it no longer works,” he said at a news conference in Baghdad with visiting French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

The New York Times version is even more blunt:

“The time for putting pressure on Iraq is over,” Mr. Maliki said in answer to a reporter’s question about Mr. Biden’s remarks. “The Iraqi government knows what its responsibilities are.” [. . .]

According to political advisers, Mr. Maliki is intent on changing the nature of Baghdad’s relationship with Washington, shifting Iraq’s role from a client state to a more equal partner.

This is a point I kept trying to make last year, when I wrote that Maliki & Co. had every reason to sincerely push for U.S. concessions in the SOFA negotiations – including endorsing Obama’s proposed withdrawal timeline.   Rather than begging for a neocon occupation to prop them up, I wrote last July, the Shiite clerical powers who put Maliki and his allies in office wanted to

… use the American military as a contractor of sorts to help cement a Shiite-led government’s power, then nudge us aside when the task was more or less complete.  Maliki’s newfound spine, if anything, just means that they think that time is drawing closer.

And it’s drawing closer still now.  Anyone on the U.S. side who imagines we’re still in a position to impose our will on Iraq, whether it’s Biden, Obama, or Gen. Petraeus and his cronies, is likely to spend the coming months finding out how irrelevant their plans are.

(Cross-posted at Firedoglake.)

Reidar Visser reports on the provincial election results from Iraq:

The provisional results of the Iraqi local elections, released today, can be summarised in three main points as far as the areas from Baghdad and southwards are concerned: [prime minister Nouri al-]Maliki and his Daawa party are big winners everywhere and particularly so in the big cities of Basra and Baghdad; the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) has been decimated across the country; fragmentation rather than the emergence of a clear secular “third way” is mostly the rule, with the exception of a respectable 9% for Iraqiyya in Baghdad and a couple of local secular successes (including Karbala).

Maliki’s rise is spectacular. His coalition won Basra and Baghdad and came first in every Shiite-dominated governorate except Karbala (where the independent Yusuf al-Hububi won most votes), with results above 35% in Basra and Baghdad,around 23% in Dhi Qar and Qadisiyya, and between 10 and 20% in most other places. . . .

The decline of ISCI is equally remarkable. From a position where it dominated most governorates south of Baghdad it has fallen to a status of a 10% party or less in most places. . . . Of the various pro-Sadrist lists, it is generally the “independent current” (list 284) that has done well, mostly scoring between 5 to 10%.

Ironically, the Dawa party wound up with the prime minister’s post (first with Ibrahim al-Jaafari, then with Maliki) because it was seen as an unthreatening, weak partner by both ISCI and the Sadrists — each of whom saw the other as its main rival for power.

I won’t venture an opinion as to whether Maliki’s reign has been good for Iraq, but in sheer political terms, he’s been masterful at playing both ISCI and the Sadrists against each other and coming out on top.  The bad news?  Now his party stands to get blamed if they fail to deliver basic services, just as its rivals were this time around.

See Reuters and Marc Lynch for further analysis and commentary.

With all the hubbub about the inauguration, it took me a few days to catch up with overviews by Reuters and Anthony Shadid of the Washington Post regarding the coming provincial elections in Shiite-dominated southern Iraq.

Visiting areas where various factions are strong, Shadid interviews supporters of Moqtada as-Sadr in Nasiriyah and notes that they also govern the province of Maysan (whose capital is Amarah).  Further, he notes dissatisfaction with the religious parties of the national government in Basra, where as Reuters explains, “the Fadhila Party is in charge.”

All this was in the back of my mind when I read yesterday’s Reuters story about the reopening of the Abu Ghraib prison, and caught these passages:

[Deputy Justice Minister Busho] Ibrahim said the newly renovated prison would house just 13,000-14,000 prisoners, including 3,500 with long sentences who would be gathered from all over Iraq. . . .

“This prison will solve many problems for us — huge problems,” he said.  “We are suffering from inflation of the prison population in Nassiriya, Basra, Amara and some Baghdad prisons. All those people will be brought to this prison.”

I’m sure it’s just a coincidence that the places Ibrahim described as having overflowing prisons were pockets of opposition political support.  Or maybe it just falls under the heading of how the national government is “preparing” for the upcoming elections.

Swopa’s pal Sistani, possibly inspired by Obamamania, is repositioning himself as the Ayatollah of Rock Da Votah:

“His eminence urges all residents, men and women, to participate in the coming elections, and stresses not to boycott it despite not being totally satisfied with the previous electoral experience,” a statement from Sistani’s office said.

It added that Sistani “stands at an equal distance from all candidates.”

Over at American Footprints, new contributor Motown67 summarizes a report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point on Iran’s actions related to the U.S. occupation of Iraq.  For an institution connected to the U.S. military, the CTC is surprisingly clear-eyed in seeing the comprehensive, multiple-choice strategy Iran has followed in Iraq.  As Motown67 puts it in his condensed take:

[Iran has backed] a variety of groups from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), to the Dawa Party to Moqtada al-Sadr to Special Groups even though they are opposed to each other. Iran supported the Americans at first as well, because the creation of a new political system was the vehicle for Iran’s allies to gain power in the new government. At the same time, Iran began reaching out to Sadr and Shiite militants.

. . . Tehran believed that elections would allow its allies to gain power. The SIIC and Dawa had already positioned themselves before the invasion as exile groups willing to work with the U.S. At the same time, Iran began a dual track policy of infiltrating thousands of Badr Brigade fighters into Iraq, supported by the Qods Force. They also had Hezbollah send some operatives to work within the country. They eliminated opponents of Iran and set up operations against the U.S.

Most crucially, the CTC notes that rather than being closely allied with Sadr (as Bushite rhetoric has falsely insisted), the Iranians used financial/military support of breakaway militants to undermine his standing in Iraq:

The fracturing of the Sadr Trend suited Iran. They disliked Sadr’s political moves because he continued to be a nationalist and anti-Iranian, and was a wild card. He could stop or start military actions when Iran didn’t want him to, which would harm Tehran’s larger political policy. The Special Groups on the other hand, were committed to fighting the occupation using violence, so Iran began moving towards them. They could be regulated by the amount of lethal aid Iran provided them.

Funding violence by former Sadrists served a double purpose — simultaneously pressuring the U.S. occupation and chipping away at Sadr’s authority, allowing SIIC and Dawa (Tehran’s longer-term allies) to reap the benefits without leaving any fingerprints.  All in a good scam‘s work, you might say.