Needlenose

…in a trophy-hunter kind of way.  This is horrific:
Collateral Murder

Via Huffington Post

“You win some, you lose some. And then there’s that little-known third category…”
– Al Gore, on the 2000 U.S. presidential election

A couple of days ago, while awaiting the final results from Iraq’s parliamentary elections, Marc Lynch (a/k/a Abu Aardvark) wrote that the country “faces a double-edged test”:

If al-Maliki triumphs in a narrow election and assembles a coalition that largely reproduces the outgoing government, many Iraqis may feel that the election was a sham, and that democracy is not capable of producing true change. If al-Maliki loses, he may not surrender power without a fight…

Or, you know, both could happen.  From the New York Times this morning:

Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s party lost the Iraqi election, but a day after the results were announced it became clear that he would fight to hold on to his post — even before the outcome was declared.

On Thursday, a day before the results were announced, he quietly persuaded the Iraqi supreme court to issue a ruling that potentially allows him to choose the new government instead of awarding that right to the winner of the election, the former interim prime minister Ayad Allawi.

On another front, officials in charge of purging the government of former members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party said Saturday that they still expected to disqualify 50 political candidates, many of them members of Mr. Allawi’s Iraqiya Party. That could strip Mr. Allawi of his narrow plurality, 91 parliamentary seats compared with 89 for Mr. Maliki’s State of Law party.

And if all that does not work, the prime minister still is clamoring for a recount. . . . Ultimately, the same Supreme Federal Court, which is nominally independent but has proved friendly to Mr. Maliki in the past, will decide the recount issue.

Yes, it’s always nice to have a friendly Supreme Court in your back pocket in case of a close election, isn’t it?

The relevance of the court’s decision is that under the Iraqi constitution, the electoral coalition with the largest number of seats in parliament gets the first chance to form a government, including choosing a prime minister.  But because although Allawi’s slate came in first in the voting, the court ruled that a coalition formed after the election would be eligible — meaning that Maliki’s party and the bloc of Shiite religious parties (who came in second and third, respectively) could unite and thereby “win” the right to stay in power.

As a result, a coalition like the one I predicted two weeks ago is still the most likely outcome: Maliki’s “State of Law” bloc (unfortunate acronym and all), his off-and-on Shiite allies (including those loyal to U.S. bogeyman-cleric Moqtada as-Sadr), and the largest Kurdish parties, creating a near-reunion of the 2005 government.

Why?  Because despite ordinary Iraqis’ unhappiness with the incumbent regime’s corruption and ineptitude, the high-level fault lines that brought about the Shiite-Kurdish alliance — in particular, the desire to remove any trace of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni-dominated Baath party from the government and especially the military — still exist.

In 2005, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani oversaw the creation of a nearly all-Shiite electoral slate in order to ensure that Iraq’s majority sect would control the country’s post-Saddam future.  Even if just enough voters in Iraq’s predominantly Shiite regions rejected that sectarian strategy (either by staying home or defecting to Allawi’s coalition) to tip this month’s election results, Sistani is not likely to accept such a swift unraveling of his master plan — and his will is unlikely to be defied by the politicians he brought to power, especially for the sake of a minority role in an Allawi-led regime.

Similarly, as Juan Cole notes this morning, an alliance between Allawi and the Kurdish factions is implausible because of the battles for influence between Kurds and the Sunni Arabs who make up Allawi’s political base in Kirkuk and other parts of northern Iraq.  As Cole concludes, “Allawi may therefore have a plurality that is incapable of growing into a majority.”

The primary impact of Prime Minister al-Maliki’s surprising (if narrow) second-place finish, if anything, is likely to be felt by Maliki himself.  Even if Team Shiite reunites as I’ve been predicting, Maliki’s rivals in the religious parties may demand his scalp as the price for patching up the assorted feuds of the last four years.  But that would put all of the factions in the troublesome position of having to agree on a successor, meaning even more wrangling before a government can be formed.

But then, given the congested and inconclusive results of the election, I suppose that would be fitting.

(Cross-posted at Firedoglake.)

So the election results are trickling in slowly from the Iraqi parliamentary elections, and the coalition led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is expressing confidence that they will come away with the largest share of the votes — a confidence that may or may not be related to the gradually accumulating accusations of fraud in the ballot-counting process.

Although all of the blocs that made up the Iraqi national legislature have frayed somewhat since the last round of elections at the end of 2005, virtually all of the major players are expected to return when the dust settles this time… most likely including al-Maliki as the prime minister.

As happened four years ago, you can expect the major Shiite religious parties to join forces with the dominant Kurdish groups to form a ruling coalition, shutting out all but a few token Sunnis as well as secular Shiite politicians like the former U.S.-installed interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi.  Although there was a much-ballyhooed split between Maliki and the other religious factions last summer, several savvy observers noted right away that a reunion was inevitable.

I wrote at the time that the strategy behind the frenemies-style breakup seemed to be to diffuse the public unhappiness with the Shiite-dominated government’s lack of results in delivering basic services:

… Maliki would pick up votes from those who didn’t want to elect a sectarian slate [again], while the Hakim-Sadr-et al. group could pose as running against the Maliki regime… even though (surprise!) everyone would wind up in effect reelecting Team Shiite, with Maliki on top.

For better or worse, judging from the early voting returns and the political jockeying that has already begun, this analysis from last August seems to have been on target.

The difference this time is something that may not bear fruit until the next parliamentary elections, whenever those might be.  By apparently unifying behind Allawi’s slate, the fragmented losers from the 2005 elections — Sunnis of all stripes, as well as secular Shiites — will in effect make him the clear, singular leader of the political opposition.

Given the rampant corruption and ineptitude of the current (and likely to be re-installed) Iraqi government, that could be a favorable spot to hold.  If the next few years aren’t much of an improvement over the last four, and voters choose not to be fooled again by a faux split among the religious Shiite parties, Allawi would be uniquely positioned to ride the wave of political resentment.   (What would happen then is something even I can’t begin to guess.)

(Cross-posted at Firedoglake.)

Yesterday was a day of déjà vu news from Iraq:

• The nominally independent election commission barred nearly 500 candidates from the voting scheduled for March 7, after receiving a request from the government to remove individuals accused of having ties to Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party. (Iraq expert Reidar Visser referred to the commission’s explanation as “making up the law.”)
• 11 men were sentenced to death for their roles in a massive bombing of two Iraqi government ministries last summer, an alleged Baathist-led plot. The regime claimed to have broken up a similar plot earlier this week.
• Perhaps in reaction to either the conviction or the political maneuvering, multiple bombs exploded in Najaf yesterday evening, near the Imam Ali shrine (shown above; an especially holy site for Shiite Muslims) and the home of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.

In the previous national elections, it was Sistani’s endorsement of a slate dominated by Shiite political parties that put the current government in power — and those same parties have consistently used anti-Baathism as a rallying cry for sectarian policies that disenfranchised Sunni Muslims.

In short, the factionalism that tore Iraq apart after the American invasion continues to simmer, even as (to quote Juan Cole) “the remaining 110,000 U.S. troops in Iraq seldom do patrols and seldom see combat any more.” Which shouldn’t come as any surprise.

For the hawks who foisted the Iraq war on us, the invasion and occupation were all about imposing the will of the United States on that country, not to mention the rest of the Middle East. Some who opposed the war saw it through a similar American-centric prism, claiming that the horrific internal violence that followed was purely in response to U.S. imperialism.

In fact, neither was the case. We removed the ruler of a country awash with armaments, and various factions have been fighting ever since for the power to rule it next. The colossal, stupid tragedy of the U.S. involvement there was our government’s decision to set off the conflict in the first place, and then to stay in the middle of it.

Of course, for some, there is an apparent silver lining:

A wave of American companies have been arriving in Iraq in recent months to pursue what is expected to be a multibillion-dollar bonanza of projects to revive the country’s stagnant petroleum industry, as Iraq seeks to establish itself as a rival to Saudi Arabia as the world’s top oil producer.

… The contracts will be administered either directly by the Iraqi government or as part of Baghdad’s oversight of international oil companies that have signed agreements during the past few months to develop the country’s most promising oil fields.

… Among the companies that have started sending workers and equipment to the country or have plans to are Halliburton, Baker Hughes, Weatherford International and Schlumberger, all Houston-based oil-services companies, and several construction and engineering giants, including KBR, Bechtel, Parsons, Fluor and Foster Wheeler.

… While American oil companies have enjoyed only modest success in winning oil development deals in Iraq, the numerous contracts signed in recent months have created an enormous backlog of work that leaves Baghdad with limited alternatives to Halliburton and the other American companies that dominate the oil industry services sector.

Funny (or sad, I guess) that some folks always seem to come out on top, isn’t it?

Remember 2003, when we just got going in Iraq?

When the count of U.S. Soldiers killed in the Iraq Occupation hit 150? We’re at 4370 now, not counting another 300 or so folks from the Coalition of the Increasingly Unwilling.

When only 1,500 civilians had died to date due to Bush’s non-existent post-war occupation planning?  Today we’re at somewhere between 95,000 and 103,000 civilian deaths…and climbing.

The cheaply stolen video feeds from our drones would make amazing youtube videos, don’t you think?

Juan Cole discusses some of the fall-out from the latest blast in Mess-o-potamia.  Given that the blast wounded some members of the Iraqi parliament, Hadi al-Ameri, a member of parliament rightly asks:

“We’ve heard a lot of brouhaha about successes on the security front,” he said. “Where are these successes?”

Good question.  Seems like things are heading South again, with increasingly brazen attacks reminiscent of the Groundhog Days of ’04 and ’05.

In the same post, Juan Cole discusses how affairs between the Kurds and the rest of Iraq are heating up around the flashpoint Kirkuk.  Those of you who aren’t afflicted with American Amnesia might remember how we called Kirkuk out as a flashpoint way back when, and how the Kurds have been continuously working to reclaim demographics and control on the ground in this oil-rich city.

I guess with Obama shifting his focus on our other failing occupation, and with our gradual troop removal the Petreus plan to stabilize the Iraqi Civil War is slowly and painfully coming off, like a band-aid on a hairy leg.

Well, it’s a start — U.S. troops may not be flowing steadily out of Iraq yet, but a lot of our stuff is. From the New York Times on Friday:

There is no more visible sign that America is putting the Iraq war behind it than the colossal operation to get its stuff out: 20,000 soldiers, nearly a sixth of the force here, assigned to a logistical effort aimed at dismantling some 300 bases and shipping out 1.5 million pieces of equipment, from tanks to coffee makers.

It is the largest movement of soldiers and matériel in more than four decades, the military said.

. . . just as the buildup in the Kuwaiti desert before the 2003 invasion made it plain that the United States was almost certain to go to war, the preparations for withdrawal just as clearly point to the end of the American military role here. Reversing the process, even if Iraq’s relative stability deteriorates into violence, becomes harder every day.

A lot of what the U.S. spent our money to build will be left behind:

Congress has limited the total value of equipment — like computers and furniture — that the military can leave to the Iraqis to roughly $15 million per base, but that amount does not include items considered part of the infrastructure, like buildings, sewerage and power facilities.

. . . Commanders say it is often simply more economical to turn over more equipment to the Iraqis because the cost of moving it is prohibitive. Last month, the military announced the end of its detention operations at Camp Bucca on the Kuwaiti border and said that $50 million worth of infrastructure and equipment would be given to the Iraqis.

But the sad truth is that not all of the items are coming home:

The military has largely identified which materials are not essential anymore and has begun to move them out of the country, in some cases to Afghanistan. For instance, lumber, ammunition and barriers used to defend against car bombs are all desperately needed in Afghanistan, and as bases are taken apart here, those are among the items sent to the fight there, commanders said.

Just goes to show that a Nobel Peace Prize winner’s work is never done, I guess. . . .

(Cross-posted at Firedoglake.)

Nada Bakri had an interesting article for the Washington Post yesterday on the latest popular TV shows among the denizens of Baghdad’s cafes:

It was time for “Dar Dour,” one of more than a dozen Iraqi TV shows that run only during Ramadan, the month when Muslims fast from dawn until sunset.

Ramadan shows — broadcast after iftar, the traditional meal that breaks the fast — are nothing new. . . . But this year, the most popular programs here break with the usual Ramadan fare of formulaic sitcoms and dramas. Instead, they seek humor in Iraq’s precarious — often traumatic — postwar life, with its endemic corruption and violence, rising prices and hours of electricity as short as traffic jams are long.

“I only watch Iraqi series,” Mohammad said as the power went off and the screen went black. “Only those shows know what we have to endure.”

“Dar Dour” is perhaps the most popular of these distinctly Iraqi dark comedies.

Produced by al-Sharqiya, an independent Iraqi satellite TV network based in Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, it chronicles the days of Abu Wardeh, a helpless man who struggles to make ends meet. . . .

In almost every episode, a policeman stops Abu Wardeh, then arrests him. The charges are always ludicrous: polluting the air, riding his motorcycle without wearing a seat belt, making too much noise and distracting other drivers. And every charge leads to a dialogue with an official that soon turns into a monologue in which Abu Wardeh lists everything that is wrong with Baghdad today: congested traffic, pollution, poverty, unemployment, corruption, bombings, assassinations and the U.S. occupation.

“I’m innocent,” he declares at the end of each monologue.

. . . ”It is a reflection of everything that goes on in Iraq today,” Jalal Naji, a 27-year-old teacher, said as he waited with friends in another cafe for the next program to begin. “The plot, the problems, the events, the people — it is almost like real life.”

. . . Another Ramadan hit here is “Who Will Win the Oil?,” an Iraqi parody of “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?” The show, produced by al-Sharqiya, was filmed in Cairo but features only Iraqis. The seats and tables are in the shape of oil barrels. The prizes start with five liters — just over a gallon — of oil for the right answer to the first question. Blond women dance to the show’s opening song. “The oil of the people is not for the people,” they sing. “It’s for the thieves.”

Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert have nothing on these guys.  Then again, I’m sure they’re grateful not to have the Iraqis’ wealth of bleak comedic material to work with.

One didn’t live to see his long-held dream come to fruition. The other did.